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A new standard for the evaluation of  solidarist institutions 
Abstract  
Building on Buzan’s suggestion that when conceived as an analytical tool the English school’s 
concept of solidarism simply describes those norms and values majorities can agree on this paper 
argues – contra most English school solidarists, who tend to be normative theorists – that 
solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. It is argued that if the English school’s 
contribution to normative theorizing is to be widely useful we need a standard for the moral 
evaluation of solidarist institutions; one that examines their value in instrumental terms. 
Specifically this paper suggests that solidarist institutions need to be assessed in terms of their 
ability to meet basic human needs. This standard for moral evaluation is then applied to the 
solidarist institutions prevalent at the contemporary core of international society. It is 
demonstrated that at least the first three of the four solidarist institutions found there – human 
rights, liberal democracy, environmental responsibility and market capitalism – foster two basic 
human needs (i.e. autonomy and physical health) and as such are instrumentally valuable.  
 
Key words: English school, human rights, basic needs, market capitalism, environmental 
responsibility, liberal democracy  
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Introduction  
Many authors from different disciplines have written about or made reference to the society of 
states also known as international society. In International Relations (IR) theory the idea of an 
international society is most closely associated with the English school. All members of the 
English schoolI agree that the condition of anarchy in international relations is not nearly as 
crippling as realists would have us believe. Not only can states be shown to interact with each 
other in a number of ways, they also do so to such a degree that they can be said to form an 
international society.  
 Works on the English school usually fall in one of four strands: (1) historical, (2) 
analytical, (3) normative and (4) ‘state-of-the-debate’ reflections. The historical strand includes 
works concerned with the expansion of international society (e.g. Bull, 1984; Keene, 2002) and 
works on different states’ systems in distinct historical time periods (e.g. Watson, 1992; Wight, 
1977). The analytical strand includes Hedley Bull’s classic text The Anarchical Society (1977), as well 
as, Barry Buzan’s complete reworking of most of the English school’s key concepts in From 
International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (2004). The 
normative strand includes John Vincent’s (1986) call for the importance of human rights and 
Nicholas Wheeler’s (2000) work on humanitarian intervention. Finally, the state-of-the-debate 
strand includes most famously Tim Dunne’s Inventing International Society: A History of the English 
School (1998), and more recently also Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami’s assessment in The 
English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (2006). The argument advanced 
in this paper contributes to the normative strand of the English school, which has hitherto been 
dominated by the so-called pluralist-solidarist debate. Pluralism and solidarism are scholastic 
terms that mean little to anyone outside of the English school and even here their meaning is not 
written in stone (see Hurrell, 2007: 58). For most scholars, however, pluralism is about states, 
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survival and co-existence under anarchy unusually expressed in a commitment to the status-quo 
(though see Williams, 2005), whereas solidarism is about the primacy of individuals in 
international society, usually expressed in a normative commitment to human rights.II A truly 
solidarist international order aims to realize some cosmopolitan goals (e.g. individualism), within 
a state dominated system (i.e. international society) (ibid. 85). Put differently, solidarists seek 
normative change – some even towards the formation of a cosmopolitan world society 
(Linklater, 1998). This was not always the case. For Bull who is the originator of these terms they 
were originally analytical concepts intended to map the actual amount of solidarity on law 
enforcement in international society (Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 68). Because value-free 
analysis is no longer fashionable or even considered possible within much of IR theory, 
normative pluralists and solidarists are not concerned with whether international order is more 
or less solidarist/pluralist, but rather much of the discussion centres on which concept should have 
primacy in international society. While notable works have emerged on either side of the debate, 
the different goals of participants means that the normative strand of the ES has arrived at an 
impasse without an easily foreseeable exit (see Linklater and Suganami, 2006: 68; Bellamy, 2005, 
84; Almeida, 2006). 
 A number of thinkers have aimed to resolve this impasse by stripping both concepts of 
their normative contents, and by returning them to the English school’s analytical strand (e.g. 
Weinert, 2011; Almeida, 2006). Buzan, for example, has argued that as analytical categories 
pluralism is simply about those institutions that sustain co-existence and survival, while 
solidarism is about institutions that sustain convergence and collective action and that both are 
present within all possible types of international society, if so to varying degrees (Buzan, 2004: 
141). The veracity of these ideas is central to the argument advanced in this paper and will be 
examined in detail later on. For now it is important to understand that if Buzan is correct and 
solidarists institutions are simply sets of norms, practices and values majorities can agree on and share, 
then these institutions simply have no intrinsic moral value. Indeed there is ‘a dark side’ to such 
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institutions because majorities can get it wrong (ibid. 85) as they did most famously in many 
states of twentieth-century Europe when they rallied around nationalism and fascism. To be fair, 
however, normative solidarists are highly unlikely to fall into that trap. Not, however, because 
they have realized that solidarism has no intrinsic normative value, but rather because the vast 
majority of normative solidarists simply equates solidarism with human rights, which – though 
valuableIII- do not exhaust the concept. Yet normative theorizing, especially in its solidarist guise 
(because it is intended as a considered move towards a more just international order), is not only 
an intrinsic part of English school theory, but it also places the English school ahead of the 
curve of much of IR theory, where the importance of normative argument for holistic theorizing 
is only just being discovered (see, for example, Price, 2008).IV In my view at least, the normative 
solidarist argument ought to be strengthened, and to this end I propose that what is needed is a 
standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions. The aim of this paper is to develop 
such a standard. Specifically, I argue that the fact that solidarist institutions do not have intrinsic 
moral value does not preclude the possibility that solidarist institutions can be instrumentally 
valuable, which is to say that they can be the means towards achieving something else that is 
valuable. I propose that in order to get at the instrumental value of different solidarist 
institutions we need to examine them in terms of how well they contribute to human well-being. 
A thing’s propensity to contribute to objective human well-being, as distinct from subjective 
well-being i.e. happiness, is the standard measure of value wherever morality is concerned. We 
can see this clearly when we look at moral philosophy. Thus although moral philosophers 
establish the value of things in different ways, for example, some focus on consequences, others 
on the intrinsic value of certain procedures, and others yet again on the character of individual 
human persons, most, and indeed most humans, agree that a thing is valuable only insofar as it 
contributes to objective human well- being (in other words, when the thing is instrumentally 
valuable). To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that all moral philosophers theorize with explicit 
reference to human well-being, only that preoccupation with, for example, liberty, desert and 
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fairness are ultimately concerned with how the human condition can be improved. I propose 
that the best way to establish the value of solidarist institutions is to assess them in terms of their 
ability to meet basic human needs. Needs are ‘prime organizing principles’ (Dean, 2010, 4) that 
serve to establish what people need to live minimally decent lives, or put differently, achieve 
objective human well-being. A focus on needs is a radical departure from much of the thinking 
of the English school. Ever since Vincent’s case for rights over needs (1986: 83–88) needs have 
played virtually no part in English school theory, when, as will be argued, needs satisfaction is a 
better indicator of well-being than the mere presence of rights. This research article utilizes Ian 
Gough and Len Doyal’s well-established theory of basic human needs that identifies in 
autonomy and physical security two basic human needs that can be tracked empirically by 
focusing on a series of intermediate needs (including, for example, adequate nutritional food and 
clean water) and their often well-known social indicators (including, for the aforementioned 
intermediate need, percentage of access to adequate safe water; percentage suffering malnutrition 
and percentage of low birthweight in babies). My aim, in short, is to establish how well solidarist 
institutions meet basic human needs, which, in turn, will allow for a judgement on their moral 
value.  
 According to Buzan and other English school scholars the core of international society 
(i.e. the West and within it the EU) is currently home to the largest number of solidarist 
institutions, which is why I take the core as my case study in this paper. It is important to 
understand that this choice does not suggest that the idea of solidarist institutions is a 
Eurocentric concept. As Buzan and others have shown, other regional international societies 
may well converge on distinct solidarist institutions (for example, religion or Asian values) (see 
various contributors in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez et al., 2009).  
 This paper is structured as follows: Section one examines Buzan’s attempt to resolve the 
deadlock between pluralists and solidarists by placing them at opposite ends of a spectrum, along 
which different types of international societies can be found. Although Buzan himself does not 
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contribute to the normative strand within the ES, his analytical and historical work serves as a 
starting point for the analysis here offered. Not only because of his discovery of seeing solidarist 
institutions as normatively neutral, but also – as we will see - for identifying a myriad of solidarist 
institutions. Section two makes the case for how the value of solidarist institutions should be 
assessed. Section three examines in what sense the core’s foremost solidarist institutions – 
human rights, liberal democracy, environmental responsibility and market capitalism – contribute 
to human well-being as the satisfaction of basic human needs. Section four discusses the value of 
solidarist institutions at the core of international society. The conclusion examines the 
implications of this research for the normative strand of the English school as well as for the role 
and relevance of the English school in IR theory. 
 
Laying the ground work: Buzan on rethinking solidarism  
 
The research argument advanced in this paper commences from Buzan’s analysis of solidarism 
as first expressed in in his 2004 book From International to World Society? Given this, it is first of all 
necessary to briefly state what Buzan has to say. One of his ambitions is to resolve the deadlock 
of the pluralist-solidarist debate. Since his argument is not a normative one, indeed he takes great 
care to stay clear of normative claims, he proceeds not by endorsing one over the other, but 
instead he returns the concepts into the analytical realm, with analysts asked to focus on how 
much solidarity (on a whole range of issues) exists in any given international society.V Though 
now sometimes forgotten, it is important to realize, that this was the original starting point of the 
terms solidarism and pluralism, which were first used by Bull in 1966 when he described a debate 
between the followers of, on the one hand Grotius and Oppenheim on the other, on the 
empirical amount of law enforcement (for example, on war) in international society. A unique 
combination of an apparent shift in Bull’s work towards embracing solidarism as a normative 
concept in the so-called Hagey Lectures from 1983VI, Bull’s untimely death just a year later, a 
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number of inconsistencies in his work concerning detachment of the scholar, coupled with a bias 
against value-free analysis soon meant that solidarism lost its original meaning as an analytical 
concept and became a normative one (see Cochran, 2009 and on inconsistences Williams, 2006). 
Conceived as an analytical concept, Buzan argues that for Bull solidarism is about more than 
simply the empirical amount of law enforcement in international society; instead solidarism rests 
mainly within Bull’s third level of society which concerns rules to regulate cooperation in politics, 
strategy, society and economy (Buzan, 2004: 53). According to Buzan Bull says the following 
about these rules:  
 
Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or 
primary goals of international life, but rather to those more advanced or secondary 
goals that are a feature of international society in which consensus has been reached 
about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence. [A statement to which 
Buzan adds:] Here one would find everything from the UN system, through arms 
control treaties, to the regimes and institutions for managing trade, finance, 
environment, and a host of technical issues from postage to allocation of orbital 
slots and broadcast frequencies (Buzan, 2004: 52). 
 
Several more of Buzan’s observations are important for the argument advanced in this paper. 
First, rules about cooperation widen the scope of solidarism, thus they include cooperation in 
the environmental, regional and economic realm, all of which were severely neglected by Bull in 
favour of high politics. Second, because solidarism is part of international society and not world 
society, and because, for Bull, international society was based on positive law, solidarism is 
identifiable with positive and not natural law (ibid. 54). Third, positive law has not prevented 
states from developing solidarist rules of cooperation. Fourth, ‘acceptance of positive law draws 
a straight line between the pluralist and solidarist positions, and eliminates the logic of their 
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being opposed’ (ibid. 55). Consequently, both pluralism and solidarism are part of the empirical 
make-up of each international society, albeit to varying degrees.  
 In line with this Buzan suggests the pluralist–solidarist debate must be rethought as a 
debate that is not about how/why values are implemented/shared (because all values are shared 
through a mix of coercion, calculation and belief), but rather as a debate about what kind of 
values are held. ‘Values relating to the survival and self-interest of states and to coexistence defined 
pluralism and therefore thinness. Values to do with convergence and the pursuit of joint projects 
defined solidarism and therefore thickness’ (ibid. 154, my emphasis). 
 Locating the prevalence of solidarist and pluralist values at the level of international 
society potentially has repercussions for the English school’s concept of institutionsVII as it is 
here that solidarism and pluralism play out. According to Buzan some institutions (for example, 
‘territoriality’) are pluralist, while others (for example, ‘equality of people’) are solidarist (Buzan, 
2004, 185-86).VIII Another observation made by Buzan in his 2004 book is that if the defining 
features of solidarism are: (a) convergence on joint values and (b) collective action on joint values then 
solidarism does not equate to a specific type of ethical commitment. Thus, ‘states might 
cooperate in one or more joint project in pursuit of one or more common value. Such projects 
can of course come in as many different forms as there are common values that might be taken 
up in this way’ (Buzan, 2004: 149, 61). In the context of this paper these observations are crucial; 
because they suggest that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. As we have seen, 
because normative theorizing especially in its solidarist guise (i.e. the move towards creating a 
more just international order) is an intrinsic and valuable part of English school theorizing, 
Buzan’s analytical approach does not suffice; and I propose that we need to develop a standard 
for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions. The latter is attempted in the following section.  
9 
 
 
Satisfaction of basic human needs as a standard for the evaluation of 
solidarist institutions   
 
That normative solidarists are fundamentally concerned with the fate of individuals within a 
state-dominated international society is clear from the fact that the concept has become almost 
synonymous with human rights.IX ‘Human rights are requirements whose object is to protect 
urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers (“standard threats”) to which they 
are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states’ 
(Beitz, 2009: 109). If, however, Buzan is right and solidarism, once more conceived an analytical 
category merely captures the idea that states converge on joint values and act collectively on 
these same values, it follows that human rights is but one of several possible solidarist 
institutions. 
 Normative solidarists hold human rights in such high esteem not only because they care 
about the individuals in a state-dominated system, but also because human rights exist in practice 
and because they have proved very successful (Donnelly, 1998). It is conceivable that normative 
solidarists would – if charged with the task of examining the value of solidarist institutions other 
than human rights – simply examine whether or not any given solidarist institution fosters 
human rights; referring back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants 
regarding questions of what human rights actually are (see Donnelly, 2003: 24 for a complete 
list). The underlying ideas here would be that because: (a) the highest value is human well-being 
(incidentally something Bull believed (Bull, 2002: 21)), and (b) that human rights can foster well-
being (see Simmons, 2009), it matters whether solidarist institutions are or are not conducive to 
human rights.  
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 Despite its intuitive appeal such an approach would only be of limited utility. This is so 
for two reasons. First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its covenants 
include a good number of questionable rights. Specifically, for the existence of a right there 
needs to be a duty bearer and the duty needs to be performable. Griffin illustrates the latter point 
by arguing that there cannot be a ‘right to health’ as specified by the Universal Declaration, as 
‘we have only limited control over health. If I am struck down by an unpreventable and 
incurable cancer, my rights are not violated. “Ought” implies “can”: in many cases we cannot do 
anything to preserve health’ (Griffin, 2008: 99). In short, having a right to something does not 
improve well-being, if that something cannot be performed. In many ways physical health, which 
is indeed one of the corner-stones of human well-being, is more adequately thought of as a basic 
human need. Needs identify universal requirements of people, in order to either avoid their being 
harmed or to enable them to achieve human well-being. Needs, in David Miller’s terms, are all 
those things ‘essential’ for a human being, in the sense of enabling her ‘to live a minimally decent 
life in the society to which she belongs’ (2007, 180-1).  
 While one could plausibly object that a right to health becomes performable when we 
speak of a ‘right to healthcare’ instead, let me now turn to my second reason why rights are not 
appropriate for the purposes of evaluating solidarist institutions. I want to demonstrate that even 
if a right is performable, having that right does not necessarily mean that one is better off than 
not having that right.  
 In philosophy rights are generally taken to be a measure of justice or more likely 
legitimacy, whereas basic human needs chart either the presence of objective human well-being 
or the absence of harm (Dean, 2010). Bearing this in mind, consider two countries A and B both 
of which have the same extensive set of rights, as well as the same institutions and policies, 
suggesting that they are just the same. A close look at their respective economies and welfare 
budgets, however, indicates that A spends vastly more money on healthcare and education 
leading to consistently higher living standards, higher life expectancy and better levels of 
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education. The lower levels of spending do not necessarily render B (more) unjust, (especially 
not if it spends the same percentage of GDP on the welfare state as does A), what it shows is 
rather that in spite of having all of the same rights well-being in A and B still differs, suggesting 
that well-being cannot be adequately charted by looking for rights alone, we ought to look for 
the satisfaction of needs as well. 
 It is important to note that none of this is to suggest that rights are not important. To the 
contrary some needs are clearly met by rights, and many needs theorists advocate rights as a way 
to meet basic human needs (see Gasper, 2007: 50).X We will look into this in more detail a little 
later on, but for now consider that the rights to liberty, freedom of assembly and to freedom of 
speech are all clearly essential in allowing people to freely participate in the society to which they 
belong.  
 
A theory of human need  
Needs theories exist in abundance (see Alkire, 2002: 78–84), but one of the most compelling 
theories – because of its operability – is Doyal and Gough’s (1991) A Theory of Human Need 
(hereafter THN). Because this theory is instrumental to the analysis that follows an explanation 
of what it contains is required.  
 Doyal and Gough’s theory defines needs, negatively, as what is needed to avoid being 
harmed (but could easily be turned-around into specifying what humans need in order to achieve 
well-being). A person is harmed when he cannot participate in social life, which in turn is based 
on the understanding that people are social creatures, whose life gains meaning only in 
interaction with others. The two most fundamental ways in which a person cannot partake in 
social life is when he is not in charge of his own life. This can happen if there is an absence of 
choices, a lack of free will or low levels of education, in short in the absence of (personal) 
autonomy.  
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 Second, a person is also unable to meaningfully partake in social life when she does not 
possess physical health, leaving her unable to work. These two basic human needs are further 
broken down into a number of easily recognizable intermediate needs. Five of these correspond to 
physical health: (1) adequate nutritional food and clean water, (2) adequate protective housing, 
(3) a non-hazardous work environment, (4) a non-hazardous and physical environment, and (5) 
appropriate health care. The remainder: (6) security in childhood, (7) significant primary 
relationships, (8) physical security, (9) economic security, (10) appropriate education, and (11) 
safe birth control and child bearing correspond to autonomy.  
 In a final step, both basic and intermediate needs’ satisfaction are translated into social 
indicators which enable the researcher to locate the relative satisfaction of each need for any given 
social or political order. For the most part the social indicators are well known and regularly 
charted by international organizations such as the World Bank, UNESCO and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Thus, indicators that measure needs’ satisfaction with regard to physical 
health, or lack thereof, include: life expectancy at various ages, age-specific mortality rates, calorie 
consumption below WHO requirements, the percentage of people lacking access to adequate 
safe water and the percentage of babies with low birth weight. Social indicators of autonomy 
dissatisfaction include: the lack of primary education, levels of illiteracy and lack of higher 
education. Importantly, Doyal and Gough realize both that there might not always be reliable 
data for all countries for all these social indicators, and that social indicators might change over 
time (prevalence of HIV/AIDS, for example, has of course only been charted since the 
emergence of the disease). As a result, their list of social indicators is both extensive and non-
binding, and any researcher applying THN is therefore not exclusively bound to the indicators 
they have identified, but can work with those for which she can find sufficient data.  
 The next section will examine the causal link between the solidarist institutions at the 
core of international society and objective human well-being utilizing THN. That is, I will trace 
the causal connections between each of the four solidarist institutions and human well-being, 
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whereby the latter is defined as the satisfaction of the two basic needs autonomy and physical 
health. It should be noted that in addition to ease of operability the latter has the added benefit 
that it combines insights gained from normative theory (especially moral and analytical political 
philosophy) with statistical data (from a range of fields, including political science, environmental 
psychology, environmental sciences and development economics). In short, the moral standard 
for the evaluation of solidarist institutions proposed here combines moral–philosophical 
knowledge with empirical–pragmatic knowledge, whereas, as Cochran has noted, most existing 
arguments by normative solidarists rely on the latter only and are therefore not always 
sufficiently grounded (Cochran, 2008: 293). 
 
The nature of solidarist institutions at the core of international society   
 
This section examines the value of solidarist institutions at the contemporary core of 
international society in accordance with the above suggested standard for moral evaluation. If 
solidarism is about (a) convergence on joint values and ultimately homogeneity, and (b) collective 
action on joint values, then it is possible to identify institutions at the Western core of 
international society that are best described as solidarist. Here states share a strong commitment 
to liberal democracy as well as to market capitalism making for a great deal of homogeneity. 
Furthermore the core has taken collective action on joint values; besides dealing with human 
rights violations, often followed by enforced and top-down democratization, also increasingly on 
global environmental issues.  
 The reality of global climatic change has brought to the forefront once again the issue of 
the finiteness of the global commons, the disregard of global environmental problems for 
territorial boundaries and the associated need for collective action. In a recent piece Falkner, who 
does not distinguish between master and derivate PIs, argues that global environmentalism (in a 
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nutshell: ‘an empirical belief that many of the planet’s ecosystems and species are under threat, 
and a normative belief that humans should take greater care of the environment’ (Falkner, 2012: 
511)) gave rise to both pluralist state-led global environmental governance (effectively a branch 
of diplomacy), and increasingly to solidarist environmental responsibility. Substantively they are 
both forms of environmentalism, yet one exists within the logic of coexistence, the other within 
that of convergence. The latter can increasingly be found at the core of global international 
society. 
 This section aims to assess the causal connection between the four solidarist institutions 
(1) human rights, (2) liberal democracy, (3) environmental responsibility, and (4) market 
capitalism and human well-being defined as the satisfaction of basic human needs respectively. 
Before I can begin that analysis a disclaimer is in order. The analysis that follows relies on data 
compiled from primary and secondary sources. Given the wide variety of data used the 
underlying methodologies and ontological assumptions vary and in some cases may be contested. 
Above all else the definitions of cause and causation adopted in this paper are informed by IR’s 
critical realists, most notably by Milja Kurki (2008, 2006), who has argued that rationalist and 
reflectivist scholars alike have unhelpfully narrowed the concept of cause to its Humean 
understanding where it refers to empiricist, observable and repeatable ‘pushing and pulling 
factors’ that designate change of a given state of affairs. When, so Kurki, social structures such as 
ideas, rules, norms and discourses too have causal impacts on the world, not only because they 
enable (make possible) and preclude certain types of action and ways of thinking, but also 
because they give way to real material structures. Human rights, for example, have given way to 
legislation as well as to the European Court of Human Rights. While not everyone will agree 
with the ontological assumptions and methodologies underwriting each and every one of the 
studies cited, I would nevertheless contend that the bulk of the data allow for at least a tentative 
verdict on the linkage between the satisfaction of needs and any given solidarist institution. 
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Human rights  
Autonomy  
I have already said that rights play an important role in meeting needs. The list of human rights is 
however extremely long and given the limits of space it would be impossible for me to examine 
each right individually, while it would be wrong to focus on only one human right as indicative 
of them all. In my view, the easiest way to observe a connection between the solidarist institution 
of human rights and well-being as the satisfaction of human needs is to examine a case where (a 
good number of) rights are systematically infringed. Such a case study at the core of international 
society is offered by the situation in Ireland regarding abortion before the signing of the 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. Before that time all abortions were deemed 
illegal except for cases where the woman’s life was in danger – including from suicide. A 2010 
report by Human Rights Watch, however, found that this exception was only notional, as there 
was no evidence that (legal) abortions were being carried out in Ireland (Gerntholtz, 2010: 17).XI 
This meant that unless the women had the financial means to travel to other European countries 
where the abortion could be carried out,XII they were forced to continue with unwanted 
pregnancies, even in cases where the pregnancy ensued as a result of rape, incest and where the 
foetus was known to have been so severely disabled that it would not survive. What is more, 
there was virtually no adequate advice or help available for women, not even to those who were 
in principle entitled to have an abortion. There was also no regular screening for birth defects 
available. 
 Ireland was repeatedly criticized for its abortion policy. The UN, for example, has 
‘recognized that firmly established human rights are jeopardized and prejudiced by restrictive and 
punitive abortion laws and practices’, and Human Rights Watch holds that the human rights 
‘jeopardized by Ireland’s restrictions on abortion include the rights to life, health, liberty, non-
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discrimination, physical integrity, freedom of expression, and the right to be free from cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment [and] the right to information’ (ibid. 44).  
 The infringements of these human rights show that, when observed, human rights 
facilitate autonomy and physical health. At the most basic level, not being able to have an 
abortion inhibits women from determining their own lives. The consequences of this are, I think, 
especially severe, when the pregnancy is a result of sexual intercourse to which no consent was 
given and in foetal abnormal pregnancies. The Human Rights Watch report conclusively shows 
that unwanted pregnancies are bad for mental health. Especially in cases where the women are 
being forced to carry out a non-viable foetus is traumatic, and ‘women are likely to suffer from 
anxiety, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)’ (ibid. fn 76).  
 
Physical health  
The connection with physical health is especially apparent in women with foetal abnormality 
pregnancies as these carry different health and typically include ‘polyhydramnios, postural 
hypotension, premature membrane rupture, breech birth or other forms of dystocia, and 
amniotic embolisms (ibid.).’ 
 Physical health was also at risk if women reverted to ‘backstreet’ illegal abortion clinics. 
Given that travelling to another European country to have an abortion, as well as the procedure 
itself is relatively expensive (€800–1000) not everyone had the option to do so. The median 
income in Ireland at that time was €580 per week, consequently for ‘someone living under the 
poverty line, the cost of an abortion could easily represent more than a monthly salary (ibid. 32).’ 
Those with lower incomes were thus doubly disadvantaged and also more likely to revert to 
illegal abortion clinics where hygienic standards and training might be questionable.  
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 Finally, the stigma of having an abortion was so bad, that those women who had an 
abortion abroad were often too scared to go for aftercare if complications (bleeding or 
abdominal pain) ensued, thereby putting their health and lives at risks.  
 The example of Ireland’s abortion policy is but one possible example I could have 
chosen to exemplify the deep connection between human rights and human needs. Beth 
Simmons’ 2009 research on the effectiveness of human rights regimes offers a whole host of 
other examples. Contrary to International Relations realists she argues that human rights regimes 
do matter because they enable groups and individuals to mobilize in the name of that right, and 
she shows that this has significantly increased human well-being in many countries.    
 
Liberal democracy 
Autonomy  
 
Democracy has been defined as ‘a regime in which those who govern are selected through 
contested elections … Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some 
chance of winning office as a consequence of election. [In short] democracy is a system in which 
parties lose elections’ (Przeworski et al., 2000: 15–16). In this section I evaluate liberal 
democracies ability to satisfy basic human needs vis-à-vis non-democracies. At the most basic 
level it could be said to foster autonomy as freedom of agency by its very nature, because liberal 
democracies take individual rights seriously (Waldron, 2002: 51). One of democracy’s 
constitutive rights is the right to vote. According to Doyal and Gough this right facilitates 
‘critical autonomy’, i.e. the capacity to reflect on the values held in one’s own culture and the 
necessary aptitude to change these (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 68).  
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  Empirical evidence suggests that democracies encourage/discourage certain kinds of 
action that are beneficial to personal autonomy. First and foremost this takes the form of good 
levels of physical security. Doyal and Gough measure the satisfaction of this intermediate need 
by looking at war victims. Research that compared democratic and non-democratic regimes from 
1950 to 1990 suggests that dictatorships tend to be more violence prone than democracies, with 
the former experiencing a war on average every twelve years and the latter every twenty-one 
years (Przeworski, 2000: 190). One of the defining features of a liberal democratic country is that 
it does not engage in warfare with other liberal democracies (Doyle, 1983). Although this does 
not stop democracies from going to war with non-democracies, if the democratic peace thesis 
holds true it should mean that as more countries become democracies the number of wars 
decreases. Among the countries of the liberal core at least war has all but disappeared as an 
institution of international society. Physical security is enhanced further by the fact that 
democracies tend to be more stable than non-democracies (Przeworski et al., 2000: 98), and that 
the change of government is more likely to be bloodless (Popper in Przeworski, 1999: 23).   
 A second link can be found in democracies’ record in providing education. Democracies 
regularly top the Human Development Index (HID), a composite statistic that measures three 
dimensions of human development: (1) living a long and healthy life (measured by life 
expectancy), (2) being educated (measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of 
schooling) and (3) having a decent standard of living (measured by gross national income), as 
well as the separately compiled education index.XIII Levels of education in turn are correlated to 
fertility and a positive correlation between female secondary school enrolment rates and lower 
levels of fertility has been suggested (World Bank Data Viz, 2013). What is more, in democracies 
government spending on health and social security is likely to be higher than in dictatorships (for 
details see below). As a result children are no longer required as insurance against old age, which 
in turn leaves couples freer to decide whether or not to have children and how many.  
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 Finally democracies’ record of economic security tends to be better than that of non-
democracies. Doyal et al.’s preferred social indicators of this intermediate need are levels of 
absolute and relative poverty. In the first instance per capita income tends to be higher in 
democracies than in autocracies (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests 
that poverty alleviation is likely to be more consistent in democracies than in authoritarian 
regimes where there are huge discrepancies between different countries (Varshney, 2000: 12). It 
is also the case that absolute poverty under democracy has not increased, whereas this has been 
the case in non-democracies (ibid. 13).  
Physical health  
 
The authoritative comparative study by Przeworski and colleagues of the material consequences 
of different political regimes in fifty-one poor countries (1950–1990) points to a positive link 
between democracy and physical health. The study found, first, that infant mortality is lower in 
democracies (at all income levels) than in non-democratic regimes: ‘For each 1,000 children 
born, between seven and twenty more die under dictatorship’ (2000: 228). Second, fewer women 
die in labour and of maternity-related causes in democracies than under dictatorships. Plus 
higher fertility rates in dictatorships put women at risk more often than in democracies. Third, 
overall life expectancy is higher in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. ‘In democracies 
with incomes between $3000 and $4000, people live almost as long as those in dictatorships 
which have twice that income. Moreover, regime differences in life expectancy are similar for 
males and females: Men live 66.2 years under democracy and 50.8 years under dictatorship, and 
women 71.5 years under democracy and 54.2 under dictatorship’ (ibid: 228). The most important 
factor explaining the comparatively better record of democracies on the physical health of their 
populations is the government’s proportional expenditure on education, recreation and culture, 
social security and welfare, housing and health. In democracies governmental expenditure for 
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these goods lies at 18.9 per cent of GDP, in dictatorships it lies at 9.2 per cent. Notably, 
‘expenditures on health are twice as large in democracies, 3.3 per cent, as compared with 1.7 per 
cent in dictatorships’ (ibid: 237). Given that democracies are likely to have better accountability 
mechanisms, they also tend to have a better record in providing a non-hazardous work 
environment. Bardhan, for instance, argues that ‘accountability mechanisms are particularly 
important in averting disasters; in their absence, major ecological damages in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe went unchecked for too long’ (Bardhan, 1999, 102).  
 
Environmental responsibility   
Autonomy  
Environmental responsibility as a social institution captures the fact that environmentalism has 
‘succeeded in establishing a global norm [whereby] states have come to accept responsibility for 
environmental protection beyond their national territory’ (Falkner, 2012, 522). This is contrary 
pluralist versions of environmentalism (we might call these state-led environmental governance 
or environmental diplomacy), which – as specified in the 1972 Declaration on the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment- insist on states’ ‘sovereign right to use natural 
resources within their national territory’ (ibid. 516). The ‘sovereignty clause’ informing pluralist 
environmentalism has had major drawbacks as far as environmental protection is concerned. For 
example, it (unintentionally) legitimized Brazil’s widespread deforestation of the Amazonian 
rainforest in the 1980s in the name of national security (McDonald, 2012, 65-108). In this section 
I evaluate whether environmental responsibility is better suited to meeting basic human needs. 
 States informed by environmental responsibility recognize that a global climate regime 
poses a significant economic and financial burden on many developing countries. Indeed, 
without the ability to develop carbon intense industry development itself is at stake. Key 
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indicators of development, notably economic security and education also are indictors of 
autonomy. Environmental responsibility has the potential to make environmentalism, including a 
new global climate regime compatible with meeting human needs by facilitating the transition to 
sustainable development including to low-carbon economies. In this regard, environmental 
responsibility currently takes the form of over a dozen multi-actor international funds all aimed 
at financing mitigation and/or adaptation initiatives (e.g. clean technology, emissions reduction 
from deforestation, green energy) in developing countries. Together these funds command 
billions of dollars in investment; indeed ‘in 2010 at the UNFCCC talks in Cancun countries 
committed to provide funds rising to USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to support concrete 
mitigation actions by developing countries that are implemented in a transparent way’ 
(UNFCCC, 2015).  Overall, empirical evidence suggests that climate funding is making a positive 
difference. A 2014 report by the independent Overseas Development Institute found that: 
‘Climate funds have broken new ground by helping countries begin to confront the implications 
of climate change for development. The finance they spend is targeting countries that need it. 
Mitigation funding is concentrated in developing countries with relatively high (and rising) 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, maximising with opportunities for efficient mitigation. 
Adaptation finance is targeting some of the poorest countries’ (Nakhooda et, al, 2014, 10). In 
other words, by facilitating sustainable development ‘climate funding’ fosters autonomy.  
 Another linkage between environmental stewardship, development and consequently 
autonomy are payments for ecosystem services. These schemes aim to lift farmers and small 
landowners out of poverty by paying them to protect ecosystems and their services.  The 
concept of ‘ecosystem services’ was developed by the authoritative Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA) and refers to the benefits ‘people obtain from ecosystems’ (MEA, 2003, 3).  
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Physical Health  
Environmental responsibility cannot only help to achieve (sustainable) development; it also helps 
to create/maintain a healthy natural environment beyond national borders.  It does not take 
much to recognize the intricate relationship between a healthy environment and physical health. 
The ability to be adequately nourished, to be free from disease, to have sufficient drinking water, 
clean air, as well as the ability to have energy to keep warm and cool, all are constitutive of 
physical health. Global warming, for instance, is feared in part because it is expected to unsettle 
the finely balanced relationship between human health and the natural environment. Human 
health is endangered by climate change induced natural disasters, including hurricanes, coastal 
flooding and cyclones. In addition, higher mean temperatures encourage disease carriers. Already 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes are found in new areas of Africa, quite possibly ‘due to a scarcity of 
cool mosquito-killing temperatures’ (Henson, 2008, 156). While the direct link between these 
two events is still being studied, it is certain that warmer temperatures will lead to more 
mosquitoes.  
  At the core of international society environmental responsibility with a view to 
protecting the global natural environment takes the form of a myriad of international multi-actor 
environmental initiatives, funds, projects and conventions that seek to protect ecosystems and 
their services. Environmental responsibly means recognizing that many of the world’s 
environmental riches (including biodiversity hotspots) are located in the poorest countries least 
well equipped to conserve them. For example since its inception in 1992 the United Nations led 
Convention on Biological Diversity aims to prevent the loss of biodiversity globally. Ecosystems 
are so closely connected that the loss of one species can reduce the functioning of an ecosystem, 
thereby reducing the number of ecosystem services available to humans (Beeby et.al, 2008, 345). 
While the convention has been unable to completely halt the loss biodiversity it has made 
significant inroads in promoting the public understanding of the connection between well-being 
and biodiversity and it has rendered signatories accountable for how well they protect 
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biodiversity in their countries. Article 26 of the convention, for example, requires individual 
countries to submit National Reports outlining precisely how well the commitments in the 
convention have been met.  
Market capitalism  
Autonomy  
 
Market capitalism is essentially an umbrella term that describes ‘any economic system where 
there is a combination of private property, a relatively free and competitive market, and a general 
assumption that the bulk of the work-force will be engaged in employment by private (non-
governmental) employers engaged in producing whatever goods they can sell at a profit’ 
(Robertson, 1993: 49–50). Capitalist systems can be more or less regulated. In this section I 
evaluate regulated capitalist systems ability to satisfy basic human needs vis-à-vis unregulated 
ones.  
 At the most basic level, market capitalism fosters autonomy because it provides people 
with the freedom to choose, a choice of goods and the right to participate in the market (Sen, 
1985: 3). While the ‘freedom to choose’ is a basic liberty, it ignores the fact that companies thrive 
by creating false needs and wants in people, leaving them neither completely free nor 
autonomous. Similarly, while a capitalist system supports the right to participate in the market 
thus supposedly giving way to meaningful employment, capitalism has often been unable to 
escape Marx’s charge that the commodification of labour leads to the alienation of labour. 
 Empirical evidence suggests two clear linkages between market capitalism and autonomy. 
First is the age-old thesis of liberal institutionalists that increased interdependence between 
liberal market economies leads to more peaceful relations between states (Held and McGrew, 
2002). As already noted above, the absence of war is a major factor in ensuring physical security 
and hence autonomy.  
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 Second is the fact that capitalist systems often invest heavily into education. The reasons 
for this, however, are not necessarily magnanimous; instead, in order to remain competitive, 
capitalist systems need to make a profit. Competitiveness can only be ensured if the workforce is 
highly skilled. In highly regulated capitalist systems this has meant heavy investment in state 
school education and free or affordable access to higher education (Gough, 2000: 28). Unless the 
economic system is regulated it does not automatically follow that there will be free and high 
quality education for all. The unequal impact of private education is visible even in a welfare state 
like the UK that invests heavily in education and where misleadingly named ‘public schools’ 
enable disproportionate access to top universities and consequently to better (paid) jobs. Thus, 
50 per cent of undergraduates at Oxford and Cambridge are privately educated, ‘one in six 
postgraduate students was privately educated’, and ‘over one third (35%) of MPs elected in the  
2010 General Election attended independent schools, which educate just 7% of the school 
population’ (Sutton Trust, 2010: 2). Figures for the 2015 General Election are similar, with 32% 
of elected MPs having been educated privately  compared with 7% of the population) and with 
one in ten MPs was educated at Eaton (Sutton Trust, 2015, 1). The school fees for Eaton 
College for the academic year 2015-2016 are £35,721 plus extras in the area of £600-£2400 
(Eaton College website 2015). The UK’s Office of National Statistics estimates that the average 
income in the UK in 2013 was £27.0000 (ONS, 2013,1).  
Physical health 
Moving on to our second basic need, there is no question that there is a strong correlation 
between market capitalism and healthcare. Thus in unregulated capitalist systems, just like any 
other service, healthcare is simply a source for enterprise and profit. As noted in the case of 
education, the inegalitarian effects of private healthcare are visible in the United Kingdom today. 
For example, although everyone has access to an NHS dentist, some treatments (for instance, 
retreatment of a root canal) are outsourced to specialists who charge over four times the amount 
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NHS dentists do for the initial treatment. These effects are even more visible in the United 
States where high premiums on health insurance disadvantage the less well-off. In short, 
although there is a strong correlation between healthcare and capitalism, it is another issue 
altogether whether healthcare should or should not be determined by the market. The 2008 
World Health report explicitly warns against the continuing privatization of healthcare: 
 
Commercialization has consequences for quality as well as for access to care. The 
reasons are straightforward: the provider has the knowledge; the patient has little or 
none. The provider has an interest in selling what is most profitable, but not 
necessarily what is best for the patient … Those who cannot afford care are 
excluded; those who can may not get the care they need, often get care they do not 
need, and invariably pay too much. Unregulated commercialized health systems are 
highly inefficient and costly: they exacerbate inequality, and they provide poor 
quality and, at times, dangerous care that is bad for health (WHO, 2008: 14).  
 
Moreover, the question whether or not people are generally healthier in capitalist market 
economies than in other systems cannot be answered conclusively. The reason for this is that 
capitalism cannot be singled out as the independent variable in physical health. Thus capitalism is 
usually accompanied by democracy and social policies (Gough, 2000: 28), either one of which 
could be responsible for a good record on physical health. What is more, capitalism has led to 
the increase of some diseases, most notably obesity and associated heart diseases and diabetes. 
Globally obesity figures are on the rise: ‘worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 
[and] overweight and obesity are linked to more deaths worldwide than underweight’ (WHO, 
2012). Obesity is linked to the easy availability of cheap unhealthy food (notably fast food) and 
to low levels of activity. For example, in 2010 it was reported that the average Briton watches 
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more hours of television (30 hours and 4 minutes per week) than ever before, thanks to more 
channels and on-demand services (Clark, 2010).  
 In summary, although capitalist systems can produce healthcare, nutritious food, 
education and clean water, without regulation not everyone has access to these goods; 
consequently, the less well-off will always do worse than those with higher incomes. In evidence, 
consider the fact that obesity tends to coincide with lower levels of income (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009: 89). 
 What has been said so far suggests that when it comes to the satisfaction of human needs 
there are better and worse capitalist economic systems. Generally speaking the less regulated the 
system, the worse it is at meeting human needs. There are two reasons why unregulated 
capitalism is so bad at meeting human needs. First, unregulated systems breed inequality and the 
more unequal any given society is the higher the occurrence of social and environmental 
problems and vice versa (Dahl, 1998:174). Second, unregulated capitalism can satisfy only ‘certain 
wants of some people by means of commodities’ (Gough, 2000: 17), these materialistic wants being 
quite separate from needs, while at the same time not increasing subjective levels of well-being, 
more commonly referred to as happiness (Jackson, 2009: 35ff.). 
   
The value of solidarist institutions at the core of international society  
 
The evaluation of contemporary solidarist institutions at the core of international society 
suggests that here majorities haven’t got it all wrong. While the scope for analysis is limited due to 
the preclusion of space, empirical evidence from a wide variety of primary and secondary sources 
tentatively suggests that while market capitalism needs to be regulated to have positive effects, 
human rights, democracy and environmental responsibility appear to benefit people extensively. 
Historical evidence shows that when people derive a benefit from something it leaves them 
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positively inclined towards its preservation (see J. Floyd, 2011: 38ff.). Watson in his history of 
different international societies shows that the most important factor in explaining the popularity 
of the Roman Empire – among its peoples and even well beyond its demise – was the high 
standard of living and the high level of personal security enjoyed under that regime (Watson, 
1992: 101). Well-being also explains why, at the core of international society, solidarist 
institutions are held in place by belief and not calculation or force. Thus in the West each one of 
these institutions is shared and endorsed beyond interstate society – if not equally strongly for 
each institution – also at the levels of interhuman and transnational society.XIV  
 Despite this positive evaluation there are problems with some aspects of each of the 
solidarist institutions in question. First, we have seen that human rights not only require a duty 
bearer, but also the duty they entail needs to be performable. Second, democracies are a long way 
removed from the ideal envisaged by its founders. Przeworski points out that democracy 
continues to ‘feed widespread and intense dissatisfaction today’ centring on: ‘(1) the incapacity to 
generate equality in the socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their 
political participation is effective; (3) the incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are 
supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do; and (4) the incapacity to balance 
order and non-interference’ (Przeworski, 2010: 1–2). Third, environmental responsibility suffers 
from unequal commitment across different states and populations within the core. Support for 
collective climate action, for example, is much stronger in Europe than in either North America 
or Australia. Yet, even the European nucleus of the core of global international society is at odds 
over the issue of reducing carbon emissions responsible for climate change, with opposition 
strongest from the newest members of the European Union (Poland and the Czech Republic) 
who are wary of the possible economic setbacks resulting from such measures. By contrast, 
fourth, market capitalism enjoys strong support everywhere, in part because people enjoy the 
freedoms associated with it, but also because they associate it with automatic prosperity, despite 
the fact that even in regulated capitalist states, there are many disenfranchised people and the gap 
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between rich and poor is constantly widening (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  These problems 
mean that it is important to note that the analysis above is very much concerned with ideals 
derived from these institutions; it seeks to draw out a large number of possible causal linkages 
between each one and the satisfaction of needs. At most we can say then that each institution 
has the capacity to satisfy human needs, but whether it actually does depends on its effectiveness, 
implementation and, in the case of the market, also on how well and strongly the latter is 
regulated.  
 These limitations and problems are important also in the context of the fact that global 
international society is highly unequal, with the core still setting the standard of civilization the 
periphery ought to achieve (Buzan, 2004, 222-227). This means that any championing of 
specifying institutions at the core will impact on international order in the periphery. Depending 
on how this is done this may not produce well-being in the periphery. Democracy, for example, 
has been exported to the periphery by force and to the detriment of many. Related to this it is 
important to recognize that while some solidarist institutions might produce well-being at the 
core they do so at the expense of well-being within the periphery. Market capitalism within the 
core, for example, is often accompanied with protectionist measures vis-à-vis the periphery, that 
seriously aggravate its detrimental effects, as, for example, EU agrarian policies with its market 
access restrictions, coupled direct payments and export subsidies show.XV  
 Finally, there is the not insignificant fact that there exist conflicts of interest between 
some of the solidarist institutions examined here. For example, not everyone recognizes the deep 
connection between well-being and the environment. Those who only conceive of well-being as 
income maximization are likely to be opposed to strict environmental responsibility, as this can 
be at odds with economic development. Indeed, conflict of interest is most acute with regard to 
environmental responsibility and market capitalism. These two forces can only be reconciled as 
sustainable development, a strong version of which would – in an ideal world – be adopted. But 
this paper does not seek to claim that the core of international society is the best order 
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imaginable; rather, the only claim substantiated by this research is that most of the solidarist 
institutions on which the West has converged are instrumentally valuable because they contribute 
to objective human well-being. 
 
Conclusion  
Building on Buzan’s observations that solidarism has no specific ethical commitment and as an 
analytical concept merely captures that states convergence on joint values and act collectively on 
the latter; this paper has suggested that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value. It was 
argued that the (normative solidarist wing of the) English school can play a better role in 
normative IR theory if we have a standard for the moral evaluation of solidarist institutions; one 
that examines the value of these institutions in instrumental terms. Specifically, this paper has 
suggested that solidarist institutions need to be assessed in terms of their ability to meet basic 
human needs; in part because the satisfaction of basic human needs is a better marker of levels 
of well-being than the mere existence of rights. 
 This standard for moral evaluation was then applied to the solidarist institutions 
prevalent at the core of international society. It was demonstrated that three of the four solidarist 
institutions found there – (performable) human rights,  liberal democracy and environmental 
responsibility – appear to foster autonomy and physical security (the two basic human needs). In 
short, these three solidarist institutions are instrumentally valuable. The picture is more mixed 
when it comes to market capitalism. While some causal connections between autonomy and this 
institution can be established, no clear connection between the latter and our second basic need 
(physical health) exists. This example only goes to show that just because an institution is 
solidarist does not mean that it is automatically valuable. 
 This research has implications for the normative strand of the English school. In the first 
instance the fact that solidarist institutions have no intrinsic moral value means that normative 
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solidarists should be aware of what they are dealing with when they promote convergence on 
joint values and collective action on these values as a good thing (see Buzan, 2004: 158). Of 
course the commitment to human rights suggests that most normative solidarists have in mind 
the kind of ‘well-being solidarism’ endorsed hereXVI, but by focusing mainly on human rights 
normative solidarists short-change themselves, because human rights do not exhaust the amount 
of solidarist institutions possible.    
 Second, this research has implications for the normative pluralist–solidarist debate. 
Along with others, Foot has long pointed out that order is of limited value unless it is just, while 
justice cannot be achieved in the absence of order (Foot, 2003: 2). This paper substantiates these 
claims; thus instead of dismissing pluralism, the idea of ‘well-being solidarism’ actually 
strengthens interstate society, insofar as democracy, human rights, environmental leadership and 
welfare systems are best delivered by strong, individual states (see Weinert, 2011). This paper 
reaffirms that for the normative strand of the English school it does not make sense to discuss 
the merits of order or justice separately from one another in the context of international society. 
It is more useful to focus on the nature of, and perhaps also the possibility of creating, a just 
international society. Thinking hard about the value of solidarist institutions is but the first step 
in that direction. 
 Beyond this, this research has implications for the role of the English school in IR 
theory. By examining how the value of individual solidarist institutions should be assessed the 
paper also establishes the English school’s value for IR theory as a whole. Thus this research 
demonstrates how the English school (who have always been interested in ethical questions, but 
whose work has by and large failed to engage the interest of mainstream constructivists (Reus-
Smit, 2008: 80)) can enable mainstream constructivists to be clear on the difference between 
good and bad norms and on the nature of progress, which they have hitherto failed to be (Price, 
2008: 3). In short, the ability to measure the normative value of different solidarist institutions 
points to the value of English school research as a whole.   
31 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
I would like to thank the reviewers for this journal for their excellent comments. I am grateful to 
Barry Buzan, Nick Wheeler and Jonathan Floyd for written comments and encouraging 
discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. Much of the research for this paper was completed 
during my British Academy Post-doctoral Fellowship held at Warwick from (2009-2012). I thank 
the British Academy for their support. Early drafts were presented at Oxford, Warwick and the 
ISA in San Francisco in 2012. I would like to thank participates at all three events for their 
comments, especially Richard Caplan.  
 
References  
 
Alkire, Sabina (2002) Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Almeida, João (2006) ‘Hedley Bull, “Embedded Cosmopolitanism”, and the Pluralist–Solidarist 
Debate’ in Richard Little and John Williams (eds.) The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World , 51-
72, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Bardhan, Pranab (1999) ‘Democracy and Development: A Complex Relationship’ (1999) in Ian 
Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds.) Democracy’s Value , 93-111, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
32 
 
Beeby, Alan and Anne-Marie Brennan (2008) First Ecology: Ecological Principles and Environmental 
Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Bellamy, Alex (2005) ‘Conclusion: Whither International Society?’ in Alex J. Bellamy, ed. 
International Society and its Critics, 283-295, Oxford: Oxford University Press   
 
Beitz, Charles (2009) The Idea of Human Rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Bull, Hedley ed. (1984) Intervention in World Politics ,Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Bull, Hedley (2002) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 3rd edn, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Bull, Hedley (2000a) ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’ in Kai Alderson and 
Andrew Hurrell (eds.) Hedley Bull on International Society, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Buzan, Barry (2004) From International to World Society?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
Buzan, Barry (2014) The English School of International Relations, Cambridge: Polity Press  
 
Buzan, Barry and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds. (2009) International Society and the Middle East: English 
School Theory at the Regional Level , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Clark, Nick (2010) ‘British Spend Record Number of Hours Watching TV’ The Independent 
(Tuesday 4 May)   
 
33 
 
Cochran, Molly (2008) ‘The Ethics of the English School’ in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan 
Snidal (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations , 286-297, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Cochran, Molly (2009) ‘Charting the Ethics of the English School: What “Good” is there in a 
Middle-Ground Ethics?’ International Studies Quarterly 53(1) 203–25;  
 
Costanza, Richard et al. (1997) ‘The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital’ Nature 387 253–60 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1998) On Democracy, Yale: Yale University Press 
 
Donnelly, Jack (1998) ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?’ International Affairs74 (1) 
1–24 
 
Donnelly, Jack (2003) Universal Human Rights: In Theory & Practice 2nd edn, Cornell: Cornell 
University Press  
 
Doyal, Len and Ian Gough (1991) A Theory of Human Needs, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Doyle, Michael (1983) ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2’ Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 12 (4) 205–32 
 
Dunne, Tim (1998) Inventing International Society: A History of the English School, London: Macmillan  
 
34 
 
Eaton College Website (2015) accessed 08/10/2015 at 
http://www.etoncollege.com/CurrentFees.aspx  
 
Falkner, Robert (2012) ‘Global Environmentalism and the Greening of International Society’ 
International Affairs 88 (3) 503–22  
 
Floyd, Jonathan (2011) ‘From Historical Contextualism, to Mentalism, to Behaviourism’ in 
Jonathan Floyd and Marc Stears (eds.) Political Philosophy versus History? 38-64, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
 
Floyd, Rita (2011) ‘Why we need needs-based justifications of Human Rights’ Journal of 
International Political Theory, 7(1), pp. 103–115 
 
Foot, Rosemary (2003) ‘Introduction’ in Rosemary Foot, John L. Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell, 
eds. Order and Justice in International Relations, 1-23, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Gasper, Des (2007) ‘Conceptualising Human Needs and Wellbeing’ in Ian Gough, J. Allister 
McGregor and Laura Camfield, eds. Wellbeing in Developing Countries: From Theory to Research, 47-70, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gerntholtz, Liesl (2010) Ireland A State of Isolation: Access to Abortion for Women in Ireland. Human 
Rights Watch 
 
Gough, Ian (2000) Global Capital, Human Needs and Social Policies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Griffin, James (2008) On Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
35 
 
 
Held, David and Anthony McGrew (2002) Globalization / Anti-Globalization , Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
 
Henson, Robert (2008) The Rough Guide to Climate Change, 2nd edn, London: Penguin  
 
Holbraad, Carsten (1990) ‘Conclusion: Hedley Bull and International Relations’ in J. D. B. Miller 
and R. J. Vincent, eds. Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 
 
Hurrell, Andrew (2000) ‘Bull’s Conception of International Society’ in Kai Alderson and Andrew  
Hurrell, eds. Hedley Bull on International Society, 3-19, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Hurrell, Andrew (2007) On Global Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press   
 
Jackson, Robert (2000) The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States , Oxford: Oxford 
University Press  
 
Jackson, Tim (2009) Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet, London: Earthscan 
 
Keene, Edward (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
Kurki, Milja, (2006) ‘Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in 
International Relations, Review of International Studies, 32 (2),189-216 
 
36 
 
Kurki, Milja (2008) Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Lachmann, P et al. (1999) ‘Health Risks of Genetically Modified Foods’ The Lancet  9172 69–70 
 
Linklater, Andrew and Hidemi Suganami (2006) The English School of International Relations: A 
Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Linklater, Andrew (1998) The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
McDonald, M. (2012) Security, The Environment and Emancipation, London: Routledge 
 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for 
Assessment, Washington DC: Island Press 
 
Miller, David (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Nakhooda, Smita and Marigold Norman (2014) ‘Climate Finance: Is it making a difference? A 
report on the effectiveness of Multilateral climate funds’ London: Overseas Development 
Institute  
 
Office for National Statistics (2013) ‘Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2013 Provisional 
Results’ accessed 8/10/2015  
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_335027.pdf  
 
37 
 
Price, Richard (2008) ‘Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics’ in Richard M. Price, ed. 
Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics, 1-53, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Przeworski, Adam (1999) ‘Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense’ in Ian Shapiro and 
Casiano Hacker-Cordón ,eds. Democracy’s Value , 23-55, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Przeworski, Adam (2010) Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government , Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez; Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, eds. (2000) 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press  
 
Reus-Smit (2008) ‘Constructivism and the structure of ethical reasoning’ In Richard M. Price, ed. 
Moral limit and possibility in World Politics, 53-82, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Robertson, David (1993) Dictionary of Politics, 2nd edn, London: Penguin 
 
Sen, Amartya (1985) ‘The Moral Standing of the Market’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller 
Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds. Ethics and Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
  
Sutton Trust (2010) ‘The Educational Background of Members of Parliament, accessed 
5/11/2013 
www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/2MPs_educational_backgrounds_2010_A.pdf    
 
Sutton Trust (2015) ‘Research Brief: Parliamentary Privilege’, accessed 8/10/2015  
38 
 
 http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Parliamentary-Privilege-The-MPs-
2015-2.pdf  
 
Simmons, Beth A. (2009) Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
UNFCCC (2015) The Cancun Agreements: Financial, technology and capacity-building support’, 
accessed  06/10/2015 http://cancun.unfccc.int/financial-technology-and-capacity-building-
support/  
 
Varshney, Ashutosh (2000) ‘Democracy and Development’ Paper for the Conference on World 
Development Report organized by the UK Department for International Development and the 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 15–16 August 1999 
 
Vincent, R. J (1986) Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  
 
Waldron, Jeremy (2002) ‘The Constitutional Conception of Democracy’ in David Estlund, ed. 
Democracy, Oxford: Blackwell  
 
Watson, Adam (1992) The Evolution of International Society, London: Routledge 
 
Weinert, Matthew  S. (2011) ‘Reframing the Pluralist-Solidarist Debate’ Millennium Journal of 
International Studies 40(1) 21–41 
 
39 
 
Williams, John (2005) ‘Pluralism, solidarism and the emergence of world society in English 
School Theory’ International Relations, 19 (1), 19-38 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (1992) ‘Pluralist and Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull 
and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’ Millennium  21(3) 463–87  
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
 
WHO (2008) The World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care (now more than ever) available at 
www.who.int/whr/2008/en/ 
 
WHO (2011) ‘Factsheet Nr 313: Air Quality and Health’ 2011, retrieved Jan. 2013 from 
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/index.html 
 
WHO (2012) ‘Factsheet Nr 311: Obesity and overweight’ May 2012, retrieved Jan. 2013 from 
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/index.html  
 
Wight, Martin (1977) Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull, Leicester, Leicester University Press 
 
Williams, John (2006) ‘Order and Society’ in Richard Little and John Williams, eds. The Anarchical 
Society in a Globalized World, 13-34, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Wilson, Peter (2012). ‘The English School Meets the Chicago School’, International Studies Review 
14(4), 567–90 
 
40 
 
World Bank Data Viz (2013). accessed Nov. 2013 at  
http://worldbank.tumblr.com/post/47634797705/does-educating-girls-reduce-fertility-rates  
 
World Bank (2012) ‘World Development Indicators 2012’ accessed Nov. 2013 at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
  
 
 
Word count: 11960 
Thursday, 08 October 2015 
                                                          
I For an idea of who exactly might count as a member, see The British International Studies Association’s English 
school working group bibliography of the English school’s back catalogue available here 
www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/es-bibl-10.pdf  .  
II Sometimes also as collective security and humanitarian intervention. 
III See below for more on this 
IV This is not intended as a negative verdict on pluralism’s normative promise (see Williams, 2005 who exposes the 
virtues of a pluralist world society), instead there is simply no room within the limitation of space 
V This is of course part of normative solidarists’ work. Wheeler (2000) for example, examines to what extent the 
norm of humanitarian intervention has taken hold at the core of international society. Because his study is ultimately 
informed by the argument that humanitarian intervention is sometimes necessary, it is also normative. 
VI The Hagey lectures are regarded by many who take solidarism and pluralism to be two opposing normative 
positions as the decisive turn in Bull’s argument (e.g. Dunne, 1998: 149; Holbraad, 1990: 186ff; Hurrell, 2000: 3ff; 
Wheeler, 1992: 476). While there can be little doubt that Bull’s world view is more solidarist in these lectures than in 
his earlier work, it is not clear why for many solidarism and pluralism appear to have lost their original meaning and 
taken on a different one. Thus, here as before it is perfectly plausible to employ the labels in their original meaning, 
of being about the empirical amount of solidarity in international society (see Jackson, 2000: 111; Cochran, 2009; 
Almeida, 2006). Consequently, if Bull’s argument is more solidarist – about which there can be no doubt – this is 
because there is more solidarity in the international society of 1983 than in that of 1977 or 1966. In support of this 
argument it is important to note that justice became an issue for Bull largely in the wake of the rise of North/South 
issues in the 1970s; in particular he was interested in the challenge posed to international society by the revolt of the 
Third World against western dominance. In short, justice became a concern for Bull because it had become an issue 
in the real world (Cochran, 2009: 215). 
VII Please note that Buzan dives into primary and derivative institutions, whereby the former contain or generate 
others. International law, for example is a master PI that gives way to endless treaties and particular laws best 
described as derivative PIs (Buzan, 2004, 182). 
VIII Given certain methodological challenges in Buzan’s framework (see Wilson, 2012) he has more recently moved 
away from this and he now argues that one and the same primary institution (PI) (can be more or less 
pluralist/solidarist (Buzan, 2014: 145ff). It seems to me, however, that it might be more accurate to holds that some 
master PIs are neutral and instead consider derivate PIs as either solidarist or pluralist. The market, for example, can 
give way to the pluralist derivative PI ‘economic nationalism’, as well as to the solidarist ‘single market’. Be that as it 
may, my concern is with clearly definable solidarist institutions in this paper. 
IX Sometimes this is expressed in a commitment to humanitarian intervention. 
X  Conversely many rights theorists implicitly rely on needs-based justifications of rights (Floyd, 2011). 
XI This subsection makes draws heavily on Gerntholtz’s report  
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XII Ireland’s leading sexual health charity the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) estimates that ‘between 
January 1980 and December 2012 at least 156,076 women travelled from the Republic of Ireland for safe abortion 
services abroad’ http://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics  
XIII The education component of the HDI is now measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years 
and expected years of schooling for children of school entry age. The top twenty for the period of 1980–2011 are 
Norway, Australia, Netherlands, United States, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Japan, Hong Kong, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Denmark, Israel, Belgium, Austria and France 
(according to data available to the Human Development Report Office as of 15 May 2011, source 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103706.html ). 
XIV Terminology as in Buzan, 2004: xvii and xviii 
XV I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point and the example. 
XVI Indeed at least one analyst speaks of ‘liberal solidarism’. See Hurrell, 2007: 57ff. For different types of solidarism 
see also Bellamy, 2005: 292ff. 
 
 
